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Abstract  
 
Objective To evaluate the effects of payment-for-performance (P4P) on the 
availability and stock out rate of reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health 
(RMNCH) medical commodities in Tanzania and assess the distributional effects. 
 
Methods The availability of RMNCH commodities (medicines, supplies and 
equipment) on the day of the survey, and stock outs for at least one day in previous 
90 days prior to the survey was measured in 75 intervention and 75 comparison 
facilities in January 2012 and 13 months later. Composite scores for each sub-group 
of commodities were generated. A difference-in-differences linear regression was 
used to estimate the effect of P4P on outcomes and differential effects by facility 
location, level of care, ownership and socio-economic status of the catchment 
population. 
 
Results We estimated a significant increase in the availability of medicines by 8.4 
percentage points (95% CI: 3.0% to 13.7%; p=0.002) and an 8.3 percentage point 
increase (95% CI: 0.01% to 16.5%; p=0.050) in the availability of medical supplies. 
P4P had no effect on the availability of functioning equipment.  Effects on stock out 
rates were similar.  Effects were generally equally distributed across facilities, with 
effects on stock outs of many medicines being pro-poor, and greater effects in 
facilities in rural compared to urban districts.   
 
Conclusion P4P can improve the availability of medicines and medical supplies, 
especially in poor, rural areas, when these commodities are incentivised at both 
facility and district levels, making services more acceptable, effective and affordable, 
enhancing progress towards universal health coverage. 
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Introduction 
The availability of essential medical commodities (medicines, medical supplies and 
equipment) is a key component of effective service delivery required for 
maintaining population health [1]. Shortages of medical commodities are associated 
with poor structural quality, or poor quality relating to the attributes of the setting 
in which care delivery occurs [2, 3], low levels of patient satisfaction, and 
preventable deaths [4–9]. Medicine and supply shortages in public facilities are also 
responsible for a large share of the out-of-pocket payments faced by households in 
low and middle income settings limiting the affordability of care [1, 10]. However, 
ensuring the availability of essential medical commodities remains a challenge for 
many low income country health systems. 
 
According to the United Nations commission on life-saving commodities, Pay-for-
Performance (P4P) is a strategy to improve access to life-saving commodities for 
maternal and child health [11, 12]. P4P provides financial incentives to providers 
and/or health care managers based on the achievement of pre-defined performance 
targets and is currently being rolled out in many low income countries [13, 14].  P4P 
could theoretically affect the availability of medical commodities  by, for example, 
incentivising the provision of intermittent preventive treatment (IPT) for malaria 
during antenatal care (ANC); through facility-level bonus payments which can be 
used to procure commodities; and by incentivising district managers to reduce drug 
stock out rates.  
 
However, empirically, only four studies have reported on the effect of P4P on the 
availability of medical commodities in low income countries. The effects are varied 
with no effects on the availability of drugs and equipment in Afghanistan [15]; no 
effects on patient perceptions of drug availability in Burundi [16]; an increase in 
patient perceptions of drug availability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
[17]; and a reduction in the availability of vaccines and equipment in another study 
from the DRC [18]. Only one study reports on stock out rates [18] and none of the 
studies shed light on the pathways through which such changes occurred. Previous 
studies have not examined the potential heterogeneity of effects across facilities and 
effects on commodities related to non-incentivised services (spillover effects). This 
paper examines the effect of P4P on the availability of medicines, medical supplies 
and equipment for reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health in Tanzania, 
and assesses whether these effects differed by facility location, level of care, facility 
ownership and socio-economic status of the facility’s catchment population. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Study Setting 
Since the 1990s, Tanzania began a process of decentralisation of government 
functions including health services, involving the transfer of power from central to 
local government authorities [19].  As a result, district level managers are 
responsible for preparing annual health sector plans and budgets to implement 
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health programmes and renovations in facilities, and are responsible for generating 
and managing resources for the district. District managers are supported by a 
regional health management team; while health facility governing committees 
oversee the implementation of plans, and the management of resources at facility 
level. Public health facilities order medical commodities on a quarterly basis, based 
on an estimate of quantity needs; they submit request to the district who review and 
send on to  the medical stores department (MSD) and distribute medical 
commodities to facilities (the ‘pull’ system) [20–22]. Districts and facilities can also 
use their own funds (e.g. insurance contributions, user fees, and P4P bonus 
payments) to procure commodities in case of stock-outs [22–24]. Non-public 
hospitals that are contracted by districts to deliver services on behalf of the Ministry 
of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW)  also receive medical commodities from the 
MSD. All other non-public facilities either procure commodities from the MSD, 
foreign or local manufacturers, privately owned accredited drug dispensing outlets 
(ADDOs) and pharmacies [25–27]. Some commodities (vaccines, Anti-retrovirals 
(ARVs), Vitamin A and family planning) are managed through disease-specific 
vertical programmes, which are financed externally, and distributed via the MSD or 
directly to facilities [24, 28, 29].  The MSD supply chain suffers from a shortage of 
commodities, inadequate budget allocations, inadequate tracking mechanisms and 
late delivery of required commodities [8, 22, 24, 30]. As a result, facilities experience 
regular shortages of essential drugs and supplies especially in the public sector [22, 
24, 30, 31]. For example, out of 1297 facilities surveyed in 2012 only 41% stocked 
the 14 essential tracer medicines at the time of the survey [31]. An assessment in 
2010 found that the MSD fulfilled 68% of hospital orders and 67% of orders from 
health centres and dispensaries [32].   
 
 
P4P in Tanzania 
In 2011, the MoHSW in Tanzania, with financial support from the Government of 
Norway, introduced a P4P scheme in Pwani region to improve reproductive, 
maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH), which is ongoing. Pwani region is one 
of 30 regions in the country and has seven districts with more than 209 health 
facilities and a population of just over a million [33]. Financial incentives are given 
to health facilities, district and regional managers based on their performance on 
pre-defined service delivery targets (Table 1) [34, 35]. Most of the targets at facility 
level pertain to increases in service coverage, with four that involve the provision of 
medicines such as Antiretroviral therapy (ART), IPT during ANC, vaccines and 
supplies such as partographs. District managers are rewarded for reducing the 
proportion of facilities in the district reporting stock-outs of essential medicines 
(Appendix 1a) for at least one week.  Districts are required to verify facility 
performance reports, resulting in more frequent contact between district managers 
and providers which may also help reduce stock-outs.  Facilities are required to 
open bank accounts to receive performance payments. 
 
Facility and district performance data are verified every six months (one cycle). For 
dispensaries the maximum payout, if all targets are fully attained, is USD 820 per 
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cycle; while maximum payouts are USD 3,220 and USD 6,790 for health centres and 
hospitals, respectively. Incentive payouts at facility-level include bonuses to staff 
(equivalent to 10% of monthly salary) and funds that can be used to procure drugs 
and supplies and for facility improvement (10% of the total in hospitals and 25% in 
lower level facilities). District and regional managers receive bonus payments of up 
to USD 3,000 per cycle based on the performance of facilities in their district or 
region.  
 
 
Study design 
This study uses data from a controlled before and after study of the P4P scheme in 
Pwani region, Tanzania, conducted in all seven intervention districts and four 
comparison districts from Morogoro and Lindi regions [34, 35]. Baseline data were 
collected in January 2012, and 13 months later. 
 
Data sources  
The data on availability and stock out of essential RMNCH commodities within the 
previous 90 days were collected through a survey of 75 facilities in each study arm.  
In the intervention arm we included all 6 hospitals and 16 health centres that were 
eligible for the P4P scheme, and a random sample of 53 eligible dispensaries. A 
corresponding number of facilities were surveyed in the comparison arm. The 
facility survey also documented facility characteristics and was administered to the 
facility in-charge. To proxy the socioeconomic status (SES) of the facility catchment 
population, we used data from a survey of 1500 households of women who had 
delivered in the previous 12 months prior to the baseline survey, and similar sample 
in the follow-up survey (20 households sampled from the catchment area of each 
facility). More details on data sources and data collection are provided elsewhere 
[34, 35].  
 
Outcome Measures 
Our main outcomes are the availability of RMNCH medicines, medical supplies and 
functioning equipment, and stock-out of medicines and supplies at the facility. If a 
commodity was available on the day of the survey, the outcome was coded 1 and 0 
otherwise; if a commodity was out of stock for at least one day in 90 days prior to 
the survey the outcome was coded 1 and 0 otherwise (Appendix 1a).  
 
Medical commodities were classified in terms of their therapeutic use as: antibiotics, 
antimalarials, antihypertensives, antidiarrheal, ARVs, oxytocics, vaccines, family 
planning, vitamin A, medical supplies and medical equipment (Appendix 1a).  We 
differentiated between items which relate directly to a P4P target and those which 
do not, to examine eventual spillover effects.  Items were also classified according to 
their beneficiary/ recipient group along the RMNCH continuum of care based on the 
World Health Organisation classification of priority medicines [11, 12]. For each of 
these groupings, we generated composite scores based on an un-weighted mean 
score across items in the group, which can be interpreted as the mean percentage 
availability/stock out rate within the grouping across facilities. We measured the 
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proportion of facilities with availability/ stock-out of the respective commodity 
groups. In the generation of indices we gave equal weight to each commodity item 
for ease of interpretation, but we acknowledge some of the items may be more 
effective than others in enhancing better health outcomes. 
 
Sub-group effects 
We examined whether the effects of P4P differed with the wealth of the facility 
catchment population to see if benefits were pro-poor, given the greater burden of 
out-of-pocket payments from stock-outs on poorer groups [1, 10, 30, 36]. We also 
examined effects by facility ownership  (public/non-public) given the differing 
procurement and supply systems in public and non-public sectors; level of care 
(dispensary/health centre or hospital) given that dispensaries are typically worse-
off in drug availability [7, 31, 37]; and whether the facility was in an urban or rural 
district as facilities in urban districts are better connected by roads facilitating the 
distribution of commodities relative to those in rural districts.  
 
To generate a wealth score for each household in the catchment area of the facility 
based on their ownership of 42 household items and characteristics using principal 
component analysis (PCA)[38, 39] (Appendix 1c). We calculated the average wealth 
score of the 20 households sampled within the facility catchment area. We ranked 
facilities by these scores from poorest (low score) to least poor, and split them into 
terciles (poorest, middle and least poor). 
  
Statistical analysis 
We compared facility characteristics and outcome scores across study arms by using 
t-tests adjusting for clustering at the facility level. We used a linear difference-in-
differences regression model to identify the effects of P4P on the availability and 
stock-out of medical commodities (1): 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃4𝑃𝑖  × 𝛿𝑡) + 𝛽2𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                           (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome of facility i at time t. 𝑃4𝑃𝑖  is a dummy variable, taking the 
value 1 if a facility is exposed to P4P and 0 if not. We controlled for time invariant 
determinants 𝛾𝑖 with facility fixed effects; and 𝛿𝑡 year fixed effects. The error term is 
𝜀𝑖𝑡. The effect of P4P on the outcome is given by 𝛽1.  
 
In order to examine sub-group effects, we included a triple interaction term 
between treatment effect (𝑃4𝑃𝑖  × 𝛿𝑡) and sub-grouping variable 𝐺𝑖. The associated 
two-order interaction terms were also included. The coefficient of interest for the 
differential effect is 𝛽3 (2): 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃4𝑃𝑖  × 𝛿𝑡) + 𝛽2𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑃4𝑃𝑖  × 𝛿𝑡 × 𝐺𝑖  ) + 𝛽4(𝑃4𝑃𝑖  × 𝐺𝑖)  
+𝛽5(𝐺𝑖  × 𝛿𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                       (2) 
 
For each of the effects we report the confidence interval based on standard errors 
that are clustered at the facility level. As a  robustness check, we clustered the 
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standard errors at the district level and used the bootstrapping method to adjust for 
the small number of clusters [40]. We were unable to test whether the availability 
and stock out outcomes were parallel between study arms prior to the intervention.  
However, we tested and confirmed that trends in facility level utilisation for all 
incentivised services were parallel prior to the intervention [35, 41]. All analyses 
were performed using STATA version 13.  
 
Results 
Baseline facility characteristics were fairly balanced across study arms (Table 2). 
However, facilities in the intervention arm were serving poorer populations than 
those in the comparison arm.  
 
P4P was associated with an 8.4 percentage point increase (95% CI: 3.0% to 13.7%) 
in the availability of all 37 medicines combined (p=0.002, 13.8% increase from 
baseline) and an 8.3 percentage point increase (95% CI: 0.01% to 16.5%) in the 
availability of medical supplies, though this was only borderline significant 
(p=0.050, 12.9% increase from baseline) (Table 3). P4P had no effect on the 
availability of functioning equipment. Effects were noted for some medicines 
associated with P4P targets (antimalarials, antihypertensives and oxytocics used for 
deliveries) and supplies (partograph), though this effect was only borderline 
significant, but not on vaccines, family planning and ARVs. Effects were also 
observed for items that were not clearly linked to service targets, but were 
incentivized for district managers (antibiotics).  
 
P4P was also associated with a reduction in stock outs of medicines and medical 
supplies (Table 4). Most of those items where we found a significant increase in 
availability, were also less likely to be out of stock.  In addition, there was a 
borderline significant 10.2 percentage point reduction in vaccine stock outs 
(p=0.073, 59.6% reduction from baseline) and a 13.6 percentage point reduction in 
stock outs of family planning medicines (p=0.062, 29.9% reduction from baseline) 
(Table 4). The effects of P4P on IPT and partograph stock outs were not significant.  
 
P4P reduced the stock out of medicines across the RMNCH continuum of care, and 
that of medical supplies benefiting mothers and newborns (Appendix 1b).  Effects 
on availability were most pronounced for maternal, newborn and child medicines 
and reproductive health supplies.   
 
The effect of P4P on the stock out of medicines overall was pro-poor, with the 
reduction in facilities in the poorest tercile being 24.5 percentage points greater 
than that in the least poor tercile (p=0.019); specifically, the effects on the stock outs 
of antimalarials, antibiotics and oxytocics were pro-poor; effects on anti-malarial 
availability were also marginally pro-poor (Table 5). P4P had a greater effect on the 
availability of medicines and medical supplies in facilities in rural districts (by 10.4 
percentage points, p=0.051, and 22 percentage points, p=0.003, respectively). 
Similarly, the effect of P4P on the availability and stock outs of antimalarials was 
greater in facilities in rural than urban districts (23.1 percentage points, p=0.020; 
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and 23.1 percentage points, p=0.070 respectively). The effect of P4P on the 
availability and stock out of antihypertensives was greater in health centres and 
hospitals than in dispensaries (by 19.9 percentage points (p=0.020) and 26.1 
percentage points (p=0.064), respectively). There were no differential effects by 
facility ownership.  
 
When standard errors were clustered at the district level, the effects on the 
availability of antimalarials, oxytocics and delivery care drugs combined, and on the 
stock out of oxytocics, vaccines and delivery care drugs combined were maintained 
(results not shown). However, the effects on composite indices for medicines 
combined and medical supplies were no longer significant.  
 
Discussion 
We examined the effects of P4P on the availability and stock out rate of medical 
commodities for RMNCH. P4P was associated with significant improvements in 
availability and reductions in stock outs of medicines and medical supplies, but had 
no effect on the availability of equipment. Among medicines, the main effects were 
for drugs associated with the delivery of some incentivized services: antimalarials, 
drugs to induce labour and manage bleeding (oxytocics) or manage hypertension 
during delivery (antihypertensives). However, there was little or no evidence of 
effects on medicines linked to other incentivised services such as vaccines, family 
planning, ARVs, and supplies such as the partograph.  P4P improved the 
availability/reduced stock outs for some of the drugs that districts were 
incentivised for, including antibiotics (ampicillin, amoxicillin, gentamycin, and 
flagyl). However, the scheme also reduced the stock out of antibiotics that were not 
tied to any incentive (e.g. cotrimoxazole, chloramphenicol and crystapen injection).  
This suggests that P4P schemes have the potential to improve drug availability 
beyond those drugs that are directly linked to the delivery of incentivised services.  . 
Effects were generally equally distributed across facilities, with effects on medicine 
stock outs being pro-poor in many cases, and greater in facilities in rural compared 
to urban districts.  Greater improvements in the availability/stock out reduction of 
antihypertensives in higher level facilities is likely reflective of the greater number 
of obstetric referral cases at these facilities, and associated need. 
 
There are a variety of potential pathways to P4P effects on medicines and supplies 
in our study.  The effect may in part be due to the provision of medicines being a 
pre-condition for meeting certain performance targets (for example, IPT during 
ANC).  The financial autonomy resulting from bank accounts enabled facilities to use 
bonus funds and cost sharing revenue (from user fees and community-based 
insurance) to procure drugs and supplies, consistent with findings from a process 
evaluation carried out alongside this study [42].  Incentives to district managers to 
limit drug stock outs were also important, given the role of district managers in the 
procurement and supply process.  By providing incentives to facilities and districts, 
the scheme ensured that stakeholders at all levels were working towards the same 
goals.  The verification system under P4P also meant that district supervision was 
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intensified, providing more opportunities for district managers to identify and 
address stock outs of a wider range of drugs.   
 
A number of medicines associated with incentivised services were not affected by 
P4P (vaccines, ARVs and family planning).  The procurement of these items 
depended on donor funding [24, 28, 29]. The average availability of vaccines was 
above 94% at baseline (91% for family planning), so there was also little scope for 
improvement. Tanzania faced a problem with shortages of ARVs during the period 
of this study due to the introduction of a new treatment regimen, weak procurement 
mechanisms, and shortages of ARVs on the global market that were outside of 
facilities’ control [43]. The lack of effect on equipment availability may be due to the 
lack of incentives attached to equipment availability at the facility or the district 
level. The cost of equipment is also higher than that of many drugs and supplies, 
which may have deterred facilities from such investments. 
 
Our study stands in contrast to a recent review from low and middle income 
countries concluding that P4P is not effective in improving structural quality of care 
[44]. However, our finding of increased availability of drugs is consistent with that 
reported from South Kivu province in the DRC [17], but contrary to the findings 
from Afghanistan [15], Burundi [16, 45] and Katanga province in the DRC [18] that 
showed no effects. The differences in context and variation in program design likely 
explain the difference in effects.  In Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC drugs/supplies 
were incentivised through service targets, and providers had financial autonomy as 
in Tanzania [15–17], and in Burundi up to 50% of the bonus could be used to 
procure drugs, however, this was not clearly the case in the other settings.  Unlike 
the Pwani scheme, many schemes weight bonus payments with structural quality 
scores, which include the availability of drugs and supplies [15–17]. While facilities 
could channel a percentage of their bonus to districts in the DRC [46], districts were 
not directly incentivised, nor were they incentivised in other settings. 
 
Despite the importance of assessing distributional effects within program 
evaluation [47, 48], ours is the first study to examine the heterogeneity of the effect 
of P4P on medical commodities. The pro-poor effects on medicines are encouraging 
as are the pro-rural effects and these are consistent with universal health coverage 
(UHC) goals and efforts to meet the sustainable development goal (SDG) 3.   
 
There are several limitations to this study. First, we used household data from the 
facility catchment area to proxy the SES of the facility’s location based on a sample 
of 20 households which may not have accurately reflected the entire catchment 
population. Second, there was an imbalance in SES across study arms, however, our 
results were reasonably robust when dividing facilities into SES groups in each arm 
separately. Third, we were unable to control for time-varying confounding factors 
due to lack of data, but confounding bias due to time-invariant factors were adjusted 
through fixed effects estimation. Fourth, although we tested and confirmed the 
assumption of parallel trends in facility utilisation outcomes prior to the 
intervention, we failed to test with drug availability and stock-out outcomes due to 
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lack of historical data on these outcomes. We were also unable to capture seasonal 
fluctuations in drug availability as this requires time series data which were not 
available. Finally, potential type I errors due to multiple hypotheses testing is a 
concern to inference, however, we used sub-groups of items to minimize the risk of 
this error.  
 
Conclusion 
Our study has shown that P4P when introduced with facility and district level 
incentives and in a context where facilities and local government authorities have 
autonomy over the use of funds can improve the availability of drugs and supplies 
making services more acceptable, effective and affordable, especially in facilities 
serving poor, rural populations, enhancing progress towards universal health 
coverage [1, 10].  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Service indicators and performance targets for facilities 
Coverage indicators Method Baseline coverage (previous cycle) 
0–20% 21–40% 41–70% 71–85% 85%+ 
% of facility based deliveries  Percentage 
point increase 
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 
% of mothers attending a facility within 7 days 
of delivery. 
Percentage 
point increase 
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 
% of women using long term contraceptives Percentage 
point increase 
20% 15% 10% Maintain 
above 71% 
Maintain 
% children under 1 year received measles 
vaccine 
Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 
% children under 1 year received Penta 3 Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 
% of complete partographs  Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain 
above 80% 
HMIS reports submitted to district managers 
on time and complete  
Overall result 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Content of care indicators 
      
% ANC clients receiving two doses of IPT Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain 
above 80% 
% HIV+ ANC clients on ART Overall result 40% 60% 75% 75%+ Maintain 
Polio vaccine (OPV0) at birth Overall result 60% 75% 80% 80%+ Maintain 
Notes: 85%+ = 85% or more; 80%+ = 80% or more; HMIS=Health Management Information System  
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.  2011.  The Coast Region 
Pay for Performance (P4P) Pilot: Design Document. 
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Table 2: Baseline characteristics of health facilities  
 
Facility characteristic 
Intervention 
facilities 
(N=75) 
Control 
facilities 
(N=75) 
Difference 
(P–value) 
Level of care    
Hospital (%) 8.0 8.0 0 
Health Centre (%) 21.3 21.3 0 
Dispensary (%) 70.7 70.7 0 
Ownership status    
Government/public facility (%) 84.0 82.7 1.3 (0.828) 
Faith Based Organization (FBO) facility (%) 10.7 12.0 –1.3 (0.798) 
Military/parastatal /private facility (%) 5.3 5.3 0 (0.652) 
Infrastructure    
Electricity available (%) 68.0 66.7 1.3 (0.863) 
Clean water available (%) 73.3 78.7 –5.3 (0.448) 
Community/ area features    
Facility in rural districts (%) 78.7 84.0 –5.3 (0.405) 
Distance (km) from district headquarter, mean [SD] 56.9 [38.8] 62.9 [41.8] –6.0 (0.367) 
Poorest SES facilities (%) 40.0 26.7 13.3 (0.084) 
Middle SES facilities (%) 34.7 32.0 2.7 (0.731) 
Least poor SES facilities (%) 25.3 41.3 –16.0 (0.038) 
Note: SD is for standard deviation
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Table 3: Effects of P4P on mean score availability of medical commodities  
 
Category 
  
Baseline survey Follow-up survey Difference-in-differences, effect 
P4P 
facilities 
Control 
facilities 
Difference P4P  
facilities 
Control 
facilities 
Difference N  Beta† [95% CI] P–value %D* 
Medicines combined (%) 60.8 65.7 –4.9** 63.9 60.7   3.2 295 8.4 [3.0 to 13.7] 0.002 13.8% 
Antimalarials – all (%) 60.3 69.9 –9.6** 69.7 59.3 –10.4** 295 20.5 [11.8 to 29.3] 0.000 33.9% 
Antimalarials –targeted (%) 74.6 93.2 –18.6*** 96.0 90.7   5.3 295 25.2 [11.1 to 39.4] 0.001 33.8% 
Antibiotics (%) 36.3 39.9 –3.6 43.1 39.8   3.3 295 7.4 [0.8 to 14.1] 0.028 20.4% 
Antihypertensives (%) 36.2 37.1 –0.9 43.8 36.4   7.4* 295 8.7 [0.4 to 16.9] 0.040 24.0% 
Antidiarrheals (%) 60.6 63.5 –2.9 74.0 75.3 –1.3 295 1.9 [–12.5 to 16.3] 0.795 3.1% 
Oxytocics (%) 42.7 45.0 –2.3 45.8 32.9 –12.9*** 295 15.0 [3.0 to 26.9] 0.014 35.1% 
Delivery care drugs –targeted (%) 39.5 41.1 –1.6 44.8 34.6   10.2*** 295 11.8 [3.8 to 19.8] 0.004 29.9% 
ARVs –targeted (%) 55.4 50.3   5.1 57.4 60.4 –3.0 210 –7.9 [–20.3 to 4.7] 0.208 14.3% 
Vaccines – all (%) 94.8 92.9   1.9 96.9 92.9   4.0* 276 5.3 [–2.7 to 13.3] 0.193 5.6% 
Vaccines –targeted (%) 95.2 92.7   2.5 97.1 94.8   2.3 276 3.1 [–5.4 to 11.5] 0.475 3.3% 
Vitamin A (%) 91.9 91.8   0.1 92.9 92.9   0.0 276 3.2 [–8.7 to 15.0] 0.597 3.5% 
Family planning –targeted (%) 91.7 99.5 –7.8** 56.5 59.5 –3.0 255 7.3 [–4.6 to 19.3] 0.227 7.9% 
           
Medical supplies (%) 64.4 72.4 –8.0** 66.4 66.4   0.0 299 8.3 [0.01 to 16.5] 0.050 12.9% 
Partograph –targeted (%) 63.5 75.8 –12.3 77.0 76.0   1.0 274 16.1 [–3.0 to 35.3] 0.098 25.4% 
           
Medical equipment (%) 55.0 54.9    0.1 72.8 68.8   4.0 299 3.8 [–4.9 to 12.6] 0.391 6.9% 
Notes: Items included for medicines combined (37), medical supplies (11) and equipment (16); “targeted” are commodities linked to services 
targeted/incentivized by P4P; Number of observations (N) is small for ARVs, family planning and vaccines because not all facilities stock these 
commodities; *The % D = (beta / baseline mean) x100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the intervention facilities; †The 
Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy and facility-fixed effects; *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 
10% level. 
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Table 4: Effects of P4P on mean score stock-out of medical commodities  
 
Category 
  
Baseline survey Follow-up survey Difference-in-differences, effect 
P4P 
facilities 
Control 
facilities 
Difference P4P  
facilities 
Control 
facilities 
Difference N  Beta† [95% CI] P–value %D* 
Medicines combined (%) 43.1 33.5   9.6*** 26.7 30.4 –3.7 295 –13.6 [–22.1 to –5.1] 0.002 31.6% 
Antimalarials – all (%) 41.9 42.6 –0.7 29.8 40.4 –10.6** 295 –10.5 [–21.6 to 0.6] 0.064 25.1% 
Antimalarials –targeted (%) 27.1 18.9   8.2 6.7 10.7 –4.0 294 –13.3 [–29.8 to 3.2] 0.113 49.1% 
Antibiotics (%) 59.1 47.9   11.2** 41.0 45.2 –4.2 295 –16.6 [–29.5 to –3.8] 0.012 28.1% 
Antihypertensives (%) 57.0 46.0   11.0** 34.9 44.0 –9.1* 295 –21.0 [–35.1 to –6.9] 0.004 36.8% 
Antidiarrheals (%) 42.9 36.9   6.0 26.0 27.3 –1.3 294 –5.9 [–22.2 to 10.3] 0.472 13.8% 
Oxytocics (%) 55.2 39.3   15.9*** 36.9 48.9 –12.0** 294 –27.2 [–43.7 to –10.7] 0.001 49.3% 
Delivery care drugs –targeted (%) 56.1 42.4   13.7*** 35.9 46.4 –10.5** 295 –24.7 [–38.4 to –11.0] 0.000 44.0% 
ARVs –targeted (%) 40.6 32.5   8.1 25.0 25.0   0.0 210 –4.9 [–22.8 to 12.9] 0.585 12.1% 
Vaccines – all (%) 17.1 12.9   4.2 6.9 9.3 –2.4 276 –10.2 [–21.4 to 0.9] 0.073 59.6% 
Vaccines –targeted (%) 15.6 11.9   3.7 6.7 7.0   0.3 276 –7.4 [–18.8 to 4.1] 0.206 47.4% 
Vitamin A (%) 14.5 8.2   6.3 10.0 7.0   3.0 276 –6.6 [–20.3 to 7.0] 0.339 45.5% 
Family planning –targeted (%) 45.4 38.2   7.2 24.0 25.2 –1.2 255 –13.6 [–27.9 to 0.7] 0.062 29.9% 
           
Medical supplies (%) 39.7 29.4   10.3** 20.8 21.8 –1.0 286 –13.1 [–23.1 to –3.2] 0.010 32.9% 
Partograph –targeted (%) 33.9 18.6   15.3* 13.9 13.0   0.0 262 –12.3 [–31.9 to 7.3] 0.217 36.3% 
Notes: Items included for medicines combined (37), medical supplies (11) and equipment (16); “targeted” are commodities linked to services 
targeted/incentivized by P4P; Number of observations (N) is small for ARVs, family planning and vaccines because not all facilities stock these 
commodities; *The % D = (beta / baseline mean) x100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the intervention facilities; †The 
Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy and facility-fixed effects; *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 
10% level. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneity of the P4P effects on mean score availability and stock-out of medical commodities 
 
Category 
Average effects Differential effects by facility characteristics 
Difference-in-differences, effect Facility SES Facility location Ownership status Level of care 
 
 
Panel A: Availability  
N  Beta† [95% CI] P-value (=1 if poorest 
SES) 
 (p–value) 
(=1 if middle 
SES) 
 (p–value) 
(=1 if in rural 
district) 
 (p–value) 
(=1 if public 
facility) 
 (p–value) 
(=1 if dispensary 
facility) 
 (p–value) 
Medicines combined (%) 295 8.4 [3.0 to 13.7] 0.002 8.1 (0.173) 1.5 (0.817) 10.4 (0.051) 7.4 (0.180) 2.8 (0.578) 
Antimalarials –all (%)  295 20.5 [11.8 to 29.3] 0.000 18.9 (0.071) 25.9 (0.022) 23.1 (0.020) 14.3 (0.119) 1.9 (0.844) 
Antimalarials –targeted (%) 295 25.2 [11.1 to 39.4] 0.001 19.7 (0.319) 19.0 (0.333) 24.2 (0.078) –23.1 (0.214) –11.4 (0.522) 
Antibiotics (%) 295 7.4 [0.8 to 14.1] 0.028 13.9 (0.113) 6.9 (0.409) 7.6 (0.421) 5.3 (0.617) –5.6 (0.453) 
Antihypertensives (%) 295 8.7 [0.4 to 16.9] 0.040 -9.3 (0.398) –7.2 (0.485) –2.6 (0.781) 12.8 (0.216) –19.9 (0.020) 
Oxytocics (%) 295 15.0 [3.0 to 26.9] 0.014 –10.8 (0.476) –5.2 (0.731) 4.0 (0.762) –3.4 (0.776) 5.4 (0.666) 
Delivery care drugs -targeted (%) 295 11.8 [3.8 to 19.8] 0.004 –10.0 (0.322) –6.2 (0.548) 0.7 (0.935) 4.7 (0.566) –7.3 (0.365) 
Medical supplies (%) 299 8.3 [0.01 to 16.5] 0.050 2.8 (0.815) 1.9 (0.849) 22.0 (0.003) 6.2 (0.522) –4.9 (0.539) 
Partograph –targeted (%) 274 16.1 [-3.0 to 35.3] 0.098 41.5 (0.065) 25.2 (0.307) 17.5 (0.510) 9.9 (0.652) 3.8 (0.850) 
 
Panel B: Stock-out 
        
Medicines combined (%) 295 –13.6 [–22.1 to –5.1] 0.002 –24.5 (0.019) –16.5 (0.110) –8.9 (0.342) 2.5 (0.771) 7.4 (0.383) 
Antimalarials –all (%) 295 –10.5 [–21.6 to 0.6] 0.064 –23.6 (0.098) –23.6 (0.111) –23.1 (0.070) 5.7 (0.624) 5.0 (0.696) 
Antibiotics (%) 295 –16.6 [–29.5 to –3.8] 0.012 –32.0 (0.032) –6.7 (0.668) –15.3 (0.322) –7.7 (0.624) 23.9 (0.095) 
Antihypertensives (%) 295 –21.0 [–35.1 to –6.9] 0.004 –12.5 (0.465) –5.9 (0.733) –4.9 (0.743) 13.9 (0.263) 26.1 (0.064) 
Oxytocics (%) 294 –27.2 [–43.7 to –10.7] 0.001 –49.1 (0.017) –27.5 (0.171) –14.4 (0.487) –1.3 (0.946) –17.7 (0.311) 
Delivery care drugs -targeted (%) 295 –24.7 [–38.4 to –11.0] 0.000 –30.8 (0.062) –18.4 (0.272) –10.3 (0.512) 5.6 (0.680) 6.4 (0.649) 
Vaccines – all (%) 276 –10.2 [–21.4 to 0.9] 0.073 1.0 (0.946) –4.3 (0.749) 14.5 (0.160) 3.7 (0.749) 17.9 (0.082) 
Family planning –targeted (%) 255 –13.6 [–27.9 to 0.7] 0.062 –29.6 (0.127) –21.3 (0.128) 3.7 (0.842) –11.9 (0.402) 8.2 (0.560) 
Medical supplies (%) 286 –13.1 [–23.1 to –3.2] 0.010 –9.6 (0.467) 8.9 (0.471) –1.9 (0.869) –5.4 (0.543) –0.9 (0.927) 
Notes: Reference category in brackets: for poorest and middle SES (least poor SES), rural (urban), public (non-public), and dispensary (hospital & 
health centres); †The Beta is the estimated average intervention effect controlling for a year dummy and facility-fixed effects;  is the estimated 
differential effects of P4P controlling for a year dummy and facility-fixed effects; and statistically significant differential effects in bold (P-value 
<0.10). 
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Appendix 1a -1c 
 
Appendix 1a: List of medical commodities and classification 
 Category/ type of classification  Number 
of items 
List of medical commodities considered 
  
By therapeutic use 
  
1.  Medicines combined 37 Antimalarials, antibiotics, antihypertensives, antidiarrheals, oxytocics, ARVs, vaccines, 
vitamin A, and family planning medicines 
 a) Antimalarials  3 Artemether-Lumefantrine (ALU), quinine and Sulfadoxine Pyrimethamine [SP (IPTp)] 
 b) Antibiotics 6 Cotrimoxazole, ampicillin, X-Pen injection, gentamycin, flagyl, and chloramphenicol 
 c) Antihypertensives 5 Magnesium sulfate, diazepam, aldomet, nifedipine, and hydralazine 
 d) Antidiarrheals  2 Oral rehydration salts (ORS) and zinc 
 e) Oxytocics 3 Oxytocin, misoprostol, and ergometrine  
 f) ARVs 7 Zidovudine, stavudine, lamivudine, lenofavir, nevirapine, efavirenz, and emtricitabine 
 g) Vaccines 5 BCG, OPV, DPT, measles and tetanus 
 h) Vitamin A 1 Vitamin A 
 i) Family planning medicines 5 Contraceptive pills, depo-provera, injectable, IUCD, and implants 
2. Medical supplies 11 Male condom and female condom, disinfectant/iodine, sterile latex gloves, delivery kit, 
cotton wool, partograph, sutures, catheters, oxygen supply, and gas supply (for vaccines) 
3. Functioning medical equipment  16 Time/watch, autoclave, delivery table, vacuum extractor, examination lamp/torch, BP 
machine, stainless steel bowls, neonatal ambubag, incubator, cord ligatus/clamp, infant 
laryngoscope, mucus suction, weighing scale, measuring tape, thermometer, stethoscope 
  
By RMNCH classification 
  
1. Medicine  –Reproductive health 5 Contraceptive pills, depo-provera, injectable, IUCD, and implants 
 –Maternal health 16 Oxytocics, antihypertensive, ARVs and SP (IPTp) 
 –Newborn health 5 Injectable antibiotics [flagly, gentamycin, ampicillin, chloramphenicol, and x-pen] 
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 –Child health 14 Antidiarrheal [ORS, Zinc]; Vaccines [BCG, OPV, DPT, Measles and Tetanus]; Vitamin 
A, antimalarials (except SP), antibiotic tablets/syrup [cotrimoxazola, flagly, ampicillin, 
chloramphenicol] 
2. Supplies –Reproductive health 2 Male condom and female condom 
  –Maternal/ newborn  8 Disinfectant/iodine, sterile latex gloves, delivery kit, cotton wool, partograph, sutures, 
catheters, and oxygen supply 
  –Child health 1 Gas supply (for vaccines) 
3. Equipment –Maternal health 7 Time/watch, autoclave, delivery table, vacuum extractor, examination lamp/torch, BP 
machine, and stainless steel bowls 
 –Newborn health 5 Neonatal ambubag, incubator, cord ligatus/clamp, infant laryngoscope, and mucus 
suction 
 –Child health 4 Weighing scale, measuring tape, thermometer, and stethoscope  
  
By P4P indicators 
  
1. Vaccines –targeted  3 OPV, DPT, and Measles 
2. Family planning targeted 5 Contraceptive pills, depo-provera, injectable, IUCD, and implants 
3. Delivery care drugs -targeted 8 Oxytocics and antihypertensives 
4. Antimalarials –targeted 1 Sulfadoxine Pyrimethamine [SP (IPTp)] 
5. ARVs –targeted  7 Zidovudine, stavudine, lamivudine, lenofavir, nevirapine, efavirenz, and emtricitabine 
6. Medical supply –targeted  1 Partograph 
7. Incentivized essential 
medicines to district managers 
 Oxytocics, Antihypertensives, Antimalarials, Antidiarrheal, Antibiotics (Gentamycin, 
Ampicillin, Amoxicillin, Flagyl), Vaccines, ARVs, Iron, Folic Acid, Salbutamol, 
Dexamethason and Family planning commodities.   
Notes: For measurement, if a commodity was available on the day of the survey, the outcome was coded 1 and 0 otherwise; if a commodity was out 
of stock for at least one day in 90 days prior to the survey the outcome was coded 1 and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 1b: Effects of P4P on mean score availability and stock-out of medical commodities [By RMNCH classification] 
Category  Baseline survey Follow-up survey Difference-in-differences, effect 
 
Panel A: Availability 
P4P 
facilities 
Control 
facilities 
Difference P4P 
facilities 
Control 
facilities 
Difference N  Beta† [95% CI] P-value %D* 
Medicine –RH (%) 91.7 99.5 –7.8** 56.5 59.5 –3.0 255 7.3 [-4.6 to 19.3] 0.227 7.9% 
Medicine –MH (%) 51.2 58.5 –7.3** 61.8 53.3   8.5*** 295 15.8 [8.3 to 23.4] 0.000 30.9% 
Medicine –NH (%) 35.6 36.9 –1.3 44.7 38.5   6.2 295 7.6 [-0.8 to 15.9] 0.049 25.0% 
Medicine –CH (%) 52.0 58.1 –6.1** 58.1 53.9   4.2 295 10.3 [4.1 to 16.4] 0.001 21.3% 
Supplies –RH (%) 93.8 99.9 –6.1** 55.8 46.9   8.9* 255 15.1 [4.5 to 15.7] 0.004 16.1% 
Supplies –MNH (%) 60.4 66.4 –6.0 71.2 70.9   0.3 299 6.2 [-2.9 to 15.3] 0.153 10.3% 
Supplies –CH (%) 58.7 64.5 –5.8 40.0 56.0 –16.0* 275 -10.2 [-31.8 to 11.4] 0.490 17.4% 
Equipment –MH (%) 51.2 50.4   0.8 66.9 64.6   2.3 299 1.4 [-8.8 to 11.6] 0.797 2.7% 
Equipment –NH (%) 40.0 38.1   1.9 66.4 56.0   10.4* 299 8.5 [-4.5 to 21.5] 0.210 21.3% 
Equipment –CH (%) 80.7 83.8 –3.1 91.3 92.0 –0.7 299 2.5 [-6.7 to 11.6] 0.583 3.1% 
Panel B: Stock-out           
Medicine –RH (%) 44.0 34.9   9.1* 22.2 22.6 –0.03 255 -13.7 [-26.4 to -0.9] 0.036 31.1% 
Medicine –MH (%) 46.3 34.8   11.5*** 26.1 34.5 –8.4** 295 -20.6 [-31.9 to -9.3] 0.000 44.5% 
Medicine –NH (%) 57.9 50.2   7.7 41.1 44.0 –2.9 295 -11.9 [-25.9 to 2.1] 0.096 20.6% 
Medicine –CH (%) 48.8 40.6   8.2** 33.8 40.2 –6.4 295 -15.1 [-25.0 to -5.2] 0.003 30.9% 
Supplies –RH (%) 33.0 35.4 –2.4 24.6 35.4 –10.8* 255 -10.1 [-26.8 to 6.6] 0.235 30.6% 
Supplies –MNH (%) 40.2 23.3   16.9*** 17.9 19.6 –1.7 275 -17.9 [-28.7 to -7.2] 0.001 44.5% 
Supplies –CH (%) 45.0 28.8   16.2* 39.7 16.1   23.6*** 249 6.7 [-17.1 to 30.6] 0.577 14.9% 
Notes: RH=Reproductive Health; MH=Maternal Health; NH=Newborn Health; CH=Child Health; *The % D = (beta / baseline mean) x100, 
where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the intervention facilities; †The Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a 
year dummy and facility-fixed effects; *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. 
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Appendix 1c: Items used to construct household socioeconomics status score 
No.  Variable description  
1. Asset: electricity 
2. Asset: working radio 
3. Asset: working television (TV) 
4. Asset: working DVD 
5. Asset: working mobile phone 
6. Asset: working landline phone 
7. Asset: working iron 
8. Asset: working refrigerator  
9. Asset: working wall watch 
10. Asset: sewing machine 
11. Asset: table 
12. Asset: sofa coach 
13. Asset: cupboard 
14. Asset: motorcycle 
15. Asset: car 
16. Household member with a bank account  
17. Number of sleeping rooms 
18. Source of drinking water: piped water 
19. Source of drinking water: borehole/ covered well 
20. Source of drinking water: open well 
21. Source of drinking water: spring water 
22. Source of drinking water: river/ dam/pond/lake 
23. Toilet type: flush toilet 
24. Toilet type: pit latrine 
25. Toilet type: no/ other toilet 
26. Source of cooking energy: electricity 
27. Source of cooking energy: kerosene/paraffin 
28. Source of cooking energy: charcoal 
29. Source of cooking energy: firewood 
30. Source of light: electricity 
31. Source of light: solar 
32. Source of light: kerosene/ paraffin  
33. Source of light: candle/ firewood 
34. Source of light: torch or other source 
35. Floor material: sand/earth/dung 
36. Floor material: cement 
37. Floor material: other 
38. Wall material: grass/poles/mud wall 
39. Wall material: bamboo with mud wall 
40. Wall material: sundried/ burnt bricks 
41. Wall material: cement blocks 
42. Wall material: stones with mud 
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